INTRODUCTION
here do exist, Celano argues, entities which can be characterised as "normative facts": regularly followed patterns of action (factual regularities) which, as such, constitute standards of correctness (norms). "Pre-conventions" are a peculiar kind of such entities.
Following Celano, a pre-convention is a social structure deined by the following conditions.
(1) Members of a social group G (let us call them "the Gs") behave regularly, performing actions that satisfy a certain action type A, in circumstances that satisfy a certain situation type S. Let us say, in short, that the Gs replicate the behavioural scheme "A in S". In this respect, "A in S" is a factual regularity amongst the Gs.
(2) he replication of "A in S" by the Gs is "automatic": 1 it happens without reasoning and deliberate choice, and is, as such, diferent from and irreducible to the observance of the "rule", or the system of rules, which prescribes the doing of A in S. In doing A in S, therefore, the Gs are not following a rule or a Discussion journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu normatively guided) behaviour, observing a rule and conforming to a norm, and the underlying diferent kinds of normative standards, rules and norms.
he point is clearly critical for the purpose of Celano's paper: it is a deinitional property of pre-conventions, distinguishing them from other types of conventions, that they are networks of converging normative behaviours which do not consist in "observing rules", either consciously or unconsciously, but rather in "conforming to norms".
Nevertheless, Celano does not develop a comprehensive and detailed account of how the distinction should be understood. Indeed, he provides various intriguing, yet vague and fragmentary, connotations and examples -observing a rule involves "reasoning", while conforming to a norm is an "automatic", "spontaneous", "luid and efortless" process; rules are "explicit", "intentional", "propositional", while norms are "tacit", "embodied", "not intentional"; paradigmatic examples of conforming to norms are swimming the front crawl, marching, acting with style, ascribing an entity to a concept, etc. -apparently aiming at suggesting rather than minutely analysing the notions. Even the diferent ways in which the terms "rules" and "norms" are actually used in the paper are not explicitly introduced.
It is my impression, however, that a more complex and rich design lies in the background. Celano's suggestions implicitly set rather clear and precise criteria for distinguishing between the two kinds of normative behaviour, observing rules and conforming to norms; moreover, based on this distinction, they trace a general account of rule-following, which seems to me to be, albeit sketchy, highly coherent, plausible, and far from obvious. I shall call it the Rules vs Norms Framework.
My aim in this article is to provide a systematic reconstruction of the Rules vs Norms Framework. I expect it can usefully contribute to the present discussion by helping to better understand, but also to support, Celano's theses, pointing out the solid structure that they rely upon and providing an interpretation of the crucial, yet not completely clear points (as, for instance, the distinction between "explicit" and "tacit" mental states, or the sense in which pre-conventions can be said to be "embodied"). I think, however, that, besides its key role in structuring the arguments put forward in Pre-conventions, the Rules vs Norms Framework deserves, on its own, to be made explicit: it, as such, constitutes one of the paper's main achievements, and marks a decisive step in Celano's intellectual trajectory, pointing at very promising paths for his future work.
In section 2, I shall propose my reconstruction of the Rules vs Norms Framework. In section 3, I shall focus on its importance and foreseeable (and desirable) applications, and introduce a methodological issue, advancing a (marginal) criticism of Celano's jargon. 
THE RULES VS. NORMS FRAMEWORK
he above deinition of a pre-convention presupposes the distinction between two kinds of normative behaviour. By "normative behaviour" I mean any action satisfying some standard of correctness and performed under its guidance or control, considered together with and categorised with reference to the mental process leading to its execution. I include in the notion not only external, "bodily" actions, but also "mental" actions, such as the ascription of a meaning to a sentence, the ascription of an entity to a concept, the drawing of a conclusion from an inference, and so on. 5 Emphasising Celano's use of the terms "rules" and "norms", I shall call the irst kind (the absence of which characterises a pre-convention) "rule-guided behaviour" or "explicit" rule-following (hereater, R-behaviour), and the second (the occurrence of which characterises a pre-convention) "norm-conforming behaviour" or "tacit" rule-following (hereater, N-behaviour).
"Explicit" rules and rule-guided behaviour
R-behaviour is a process characterised by the following properties: (1) it develops in more than one step; (2) it is explicit; (3) it is (comparatively) slow and efortful. Let us examine them in some detail.
(1) More than one step Let us use provisionally the term "rule" to indicate any representation of an action type A in a situation type S which a concrete action has to satisfy in order to be correct; in other words, any model setting the features of correct action.
he agent consciously experiences R-behaviour as a process developing in more than one step. We can sketchily summarise and describe these steps as rule formulation, reasoning, decision and observance.
Rule formulation. he agent comes to the mental representation of an action type A in a situation type S, satisied by the circumstances she actually faces, conceiving it as the rule to be followed, the model setting the features of the correct action to be done in the actual situation. In other words, the agent comes to believe that the right thing to do presently is to follow the rule which prescribes the doing of A in S (i.e., to act in a way that satisies the represented action type). 6 he rule is, moreover, somehow linguistically structured: the agent has in mind (already formed or immediately available) an expression of both A and S in natural language terms ("Stop at a red light", "Add two to the last number of Discussion journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu the sequence"), or in another shared symbolic code. In short, the agent comes to the (mental) formulation of the rule to be followed.
Reasoning. he agent uses the rule to discriminate between two alternative courses of action, both believed to be possible: to follow or not to follow the rule (i.e., to act or not to act in a way that satisies the represented action type). In order to make a choice, she compares then the options, weighing the pros and cons: a more or less articulated "(practical) reasoning" in a very wide sense of the term (it may be nothing more than a lash on a few imagined scenarios, or an accurate selection and balance of the most plausible ones; it could conirm the validity of the rule, or lead her to begin a new process of reasoning in search of another rule, etc.).
Decision and observance. he agent inally comes to the decision to follow the rule and efectively follows it (i.e., she decides to perform presently a certain action because it satisies the action type A that should be performed in the situation type S, satisied by the circumstances she actually faces, and her decision efectively leads her to perform it). 7 (2) Explicit Given its structure, R-behaviour can also be said to be a threefold "explicit" process guided by a threefold "explicit" standard of correctness.
he rule guiding R-behaviour can, in fact, be said to be "explicit" in three diferent senses: because it is conscious, because it is (mentally) formulated, and because it functions as a reason.
(a) Explicit as "conscious". During the process, the agent has conscious access to the rule. his is not to be meant only in the sense that she somehow consciously feels that she is acting appropriately (as we shall soon see, such a feeling could also be present in N-behaviour). What is peculiar to R-behaviour is, rather, that the agent has, during the process, a conscious mental representation of the features of a possible action in a possible situation (i.e., a conscious mental representation of an action type A in a situation type S), which a concrete action has to satisfy in order to be correct, and she consciously its her actual behaviour with that representation. She consciously "looks with the mind's eye", so to speak, at the model for her action, and consciously conforms to it.
(b) Explicit as "(mentally) formulated". he agent has in mind, already formed or immediately available, an expression of both A and S in natural lan-journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Marco Brigaglia www.revus.eu guage terms, or in another shared symbolic code. She is, therefore, ready to communicate in an abstract, descriptive way the features that make her action correct.
(c) Explicit as "functioning as a reason". 8 he rule does not operate through the automatic production of the prescribed action. It is, instead, the starting point of a conscious mental comparison between diferent options (i.e., a more or less articulated reasoning), which could, in principle, lead to the decision both to follow and not to follow the rule. Using Searle's words, 9 there is a gap in the process: the agent stops her acting and "looks" at the rule, holds it for a while in theoretical space, imaging and balancing the courses of action discriminated by it, taking eventually into account reasons for and against, sometimes starting a new process which can lead to the identiication of another rule, etc. In short, the rule functions properly as a reason for action. 10 Being guided by a threefold explicit rule, R-behaviour can correspondingly also be said to be an "explicit" process in three diferent senses: transparent, discursive, ratiocinative. It is "transparent" because it is guided by a consciously accessed ("visible") rule. It is "discursive" because it is guided by a rule which is already formulated in an "inner discourse" and ready to be formulated in a public discourse. It is "ratiocinative" because it involves reasoning, in which the rule functions properly as a reason.
(3) Slow and efortful R-behaviour is also consciously perceived as a (comparatively) slow and efortful process: the steps through which it develops take some time and the reasoning requires some mental efort, more time and more efort than what is needed for an automatic reaction; moreover, the conscious decision to follow the rule can be costly and even painful. Such an introspective appearance of slowness and efort is strictly correlated with behavioural features, external signs perceptible by an observer: the action is not luent, there is a perceptible gap, a kind of hesitation preceding acting, and sometimes unskilful execution; prior to and possibly during the action, the agent shows signs of mental concentration (and sometimes of stress or even pain). Discussion 
Norms and norm-conforming behaviour
R-behaviour develops in more than one step, is threefold explicit (transparent, discursive, ratiocinative), is slow and efortful. By contrast, N-behaviour (1) develops in one single step, (2) is threefold tacit (opaque, dumb, automatic), (3) is fast and efortless.
(1) One step he agent consciously experiences N-behaviour as developing in one single step, the automatic, spontaneous performance of an action: facing circumstances satisfying a situation type S, the agent immediately, without any conscious deliberation and decision, acts in a way that satisies an action type A. he action, however, is not accidental, but responds to a general disposition: facing S, the agent regularly does or has the impulse to do A. In short, the agent tends to spontaneously replicate the scheme "A in S".
But this is not enough. he disposition underlying cases of N-behaviour is, indeed, something more than a factual regularity: it has, diferently from other kinds of automatic actions, a normative character. Firstly, the agent, being able to discern those concrete behaviours which, in S, satisfy A and those which deviate from A, has the disposition to feel, or judge intuitively, that the former are correct (appropriate, right) and the latter incorrect (inappropriate, wrong). Secondly, these very normative feelings or judgments contribute to the replication of "A in S": if the agent, facing S, deviated from A, she would have a feeling of wrongness which would cause her to adjust her behaviour until it satisies A; if, instead, she conformed to A, the action would proceed luently, eventually accompanied by a feeling of appropriateness. In short, the agent tends to act spontaneously in a way that is (or better yet: that the same agent would consider to be) correct, because this is (it would be considered to be) the correct way of acting. 11 journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Marco Brigaglia www.revus.eu (2) Tacit Given its structure, N-behaviour appears to be the outcome of some internal mechanism which controls (i) the spontaneous identiication (of tokens) of both A and S, (ii) the spontaneous replication of A when S is obtained, and (iii) the intuitive judgment that those concrete behaviours which, in S, satisfy A are correct and those which deviate from A are incorrect, with (iii) being, in some way, a contributory condition of (ii).
We could also describe this mechanism by saying that the agent's behaviour is guided by a mental representation of the scheme "A in S", which is "functionally analogous" to a rule: it functions as a model setting the features of the correct action. But, diferently from a rule guiding R-behaviour, such a rulelike scheme is "tacit" (implicit, inexplicit) in three diferent senses: it is unconscious, it is unformulated, it does not function as a reason. Correspondingly, N-behaviour appears to be a threefold "tacit" process: opaque, dumb, not ratiocinative or automatic. Let us try to clarify the point.
(a) Tacit as "unconscious". he agent has no conscious access to the scheme she conforms to. his is not to mean that the action and its normative character are completely unperceived. he action is consciously performed, and the agent could also feel that she acts appropriately; she could even think that her ability to act and her feeling of appropriateness depend on some rule-like scheme deeply encoded in her mind. But, she cannot be said to be looking at it "with the mind's eye". She has, at least during the process, no conscious mental representation at all of a possible action A in a possible situation S as the action to be performed. Consequently, she does not consciously it her behaviour with any model: she just directly acts in the correct way. For this very reason, N-behaviour can be said to be an "opaque" process: during the process, the scheme that the agent conforms to remains, as such, "invisible" to her.
(A point should be clariied. She who conforms to a norm can be said to have conscious access to it somehow: she is able to conform to the norm and recognise the correctness of her action. 12 But she is not able to consciously discern the features that render it correct, keep them in mind and use them as a model. In order to distinguish between these two diferent forms of access, we can talk of "intellectual" (or "analytical" or "abstract") access for the form in which rules are accessed, and of "non-intellectual" (or "synthetic" or "concrete") access for the form in which norms are accessed.) (b) Tacit as "(mentally) unformulated". he implemented scheme, by consequence, remains also unformulated: during the process, the agent does not have in mind an expression in natural language terms (or in another shared symbolic Discussion journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu code) of both A and S. She is, therefore, not ready, or perhaps not able at all, to communicate in an abstract, descriptive way the features that make her action correct. 13 She is only ready to indicate by ostension a concrete exemplar of correct behaviour. In this sense, N-behaviour appears to be a "dumb" process.
(c) Tacit as "not functioning as a reason". he scheme is automatically implemented, leaving no room for a previous check on whether the action to be performed is or is not the right one to take, no room for thinking whether to act or not to act conforming to the scheme, weighing the reasons for and against. Facing S, the agent just does A spontaneously, without any reasoning. In this sense, the scheme "A in S" does not function properly as a reason, and N-behaviour appears not to be a ratiocinative, but an automatic process. 14 It is precisely in virtue of their being "tacit", in the sense above described, that the schemes underlying cases of N-behaviour can also be said to be "embodied": 15 because they manifest themselves directly through the performance ("embodiment", concrete execution) of correct actions, without the intermediation of conscious mental activities, such as reasoning and decisionmaking, explicitly representing them as models to be followed. On the other hand, it is precisely in virtue of their being based on "tacit" schemes that cases of N-behaviour can be said to be "normative facts": 16 because the standard according to which they count as correct is accessed directly in their concrete, factual execution (the measure of their correctness lies in their very factual instantiation).
(3) Fast and efortless N-behaviour is also perceived as a (comparatively) fast and efortless process: the agent acts immediately without thinking about it, and the action requires less mental efort than the efort needed for reasoning and conscious control. Such introspective appearance is strictly correlated with behavioural features: luency, lack of hesitation, no sign of mental concentration. 17 13 Celano 2016: 13. 14 Celano does not deine explicitly what a norm being tacit amounts to. He only stresses that it is the same sense in which we can be said to "tacitly" believe a proposition which is not stored in our memory as true, but which we would nevertheless immediately and efortlessly recognise as obviously true, without any conscious reasoning. his sense should be distinguished from that in which we can be said to "tacitly believe" propositions stored in our memory as true when they are not presently thought (Celano 2016: 13-14) . It should be noted that, in this second sense, rules can also be said to be "tacitly believed" if they are stored in memory as valid rules and can, as such, be recalled. 15 Celano 2016 : 12, 14-15, 18-19, 27, 29. 16 Celano 2016 Note that the intuitive judgment of correctness underlying N-behaviour is also a case of Nbehaviour: a mental action automatically performed under the guidance or control of the same norm, responding to a general disposition. What I have said above about N-behaviour journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Marco Brigaglia
www.revus.eu
Following Celano, we can use the term "norm" to indicate tacit rule-like schemes underlying cases of N-behaviour (hence its name: norm-conforming behaviour). We can use the term "rule" in two senses: more generally, as a commonsensical term indicating any model setting the features of correct actions; and more speciically, as a technical term indicating only explicit models guiding R-behaviour (hence its name: rule-guided behaviour). I shall occasionally refer to the scheme A in S as the "content" of rules or norms.
Dynamics of rules and norms
his is, however, only a irst approximation on the opposition between Rand N-behaviour, rules and norms, as it emerges in Celano's paper. hree further clariications will deepen our understanding of the notions, making their relation more dynamic than it has so far appeared.
(1) R-behaviour and N-behaviour should not be thought of as mutually exclusive mental processes in two senses.
First, they can operate together as a network of interconnected processes determining the same action. Let us take a swimming training as an example. he trainer gives the athletes their irst task of the day: "2000 m of front crawl". he athletes understand his utterance as establishing a rule and, having it in mind, ater ritually protesting against such a boring task and its ritual, inlexible reiteration, start swimming: a case of R-behaviour. But, in swimming, they do not follow a set of rules specifying which precise sequence of movements instantiates a front crawl stroke; they just replicate it automatically, with the underlying disposition to have a feeling of wrongness in the case of incorrect performance, and possibly a feeling of appropriateness in the case of correct performance: a case of N-behaviour. Furthermore (Celano argues, following Wittgenstein), any instance of R-behaviour is necessarily interconnected with, must rely upon, some form of N-behaviour: to avoid ininite regress, there must necessarily be, at some point, an understanding of the concepts appearing in a rule, which does not consist in following other rules specifying their meaning, but which consists in an automatic (and shared) discrimination between cases which do constitute a token (i.e., a correct application) of the concept and cases which do not. In short, all rules necessarily rely on a background of norms. Let us call this "tacit normative background".
Second, one and the same scheme "A in S" could function for one and the same agent at diferent moments either as a rule or as a norm. hink, for example, about a Lewis convention: the relevant behaviour, Celano says, can iniapplies, therefore, to this judgment as well: when judging a concrete instance of A in S as correct or incorrect, the agent neither compares it to some consciously accessed model nor reasons about it, but directly (intuitively) recognises it as correct or incorrect; moreover, she is not ready to verbalise the reasons supporting her judgment. Discussion journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu tially be performed under the guidance of proper reasoning (R-behaviour) and then become automatic (N-behaviour); 18 but, the agent could, at some moment, be able to stop the habit and make again explicit the rule she follows (again R-behaviour). In other words, one and the same scheme "A in S" for one and the same agent can be subject to a "functional shit" from rule to norm and vice versa. A behavioural pattern, initially performed under the explicit guidance of a rule, and reiterated over and over, becomes tacit with the passing of time without losing its normative character: a rule is turned into a norm (this is exactly what acquiring an ability amounts to). he agent, having internalised A in S as a norm, suspends its automatic application, makes its content explicit trough introspection, deliberates about it and inally decides to conform: a norm is turned into a rule (this is exactly what taking a critical stance on our own habits and prejudices amounts to). But, we should be aware of a crucial point. here will be cases in which the functional shit from norm to rule and from rule to norm can occur freely: some of our norms can be made explicit, and some of our rules can become tacit. We can, however, imagine that in other cases, given the structural or contingent limitations of our mind, the shit cannot take place. Some rules cannot be turned into norms: we cannot automatise some behavioural patterns that we otherwise recognise and follow as explicit rules (because they are "too complicated", because they are "too counter-intuitive", and so on). And some norms cannot be turned into rules: we cannot make explicit some of the norms we conform to (i.e., we cannot consciously access and formulate their content, and sometimes we cannot even suspend their automatic application). Let us call them "the deep normative background": 19 the part of our tacit normative background which we can neither make explicit nor describe nor consciously access (in the "intellectual" form), but which we can only directly apply and recognise in its correct applications (i.e., we can only access it in the "non-intellectual" form).
(2) So far, we have drawn a sharp distinction between R-and N-behaviour on the basis of a set of opposed properties: more than one step/one step, explicit/tacit (transparent/opaque, discursive/dumb, ratiocinative/automatic), slow/fast, efortful/efortless. However, this sharp distinction between R-and N-behaviour does not exhaust the possibility of the same properties being combined. In fact, we can easily imagine cases of normative behaviour which share the properties of both R and N-behaviour.
Let us consider, for instance, the following pattern. he agent does A in S; in her doing A in S, she does not consciously it her action with a consciously accessed model; nevertheless, her behaviour is normative (she has the disposition to regard as correct those actions which, in S, satisfy A and as incorrect journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Marco Brigaglia www.revus.eu those which do not, and this disposition contributes causally to her doing A in S): these are properties of N-behaviour. Her action, however, is neither fast nor efortless: facing S, she hesitates before doing A, showing signs of mental efort, which are properties of R-behaviour. Let us think about a diferent pattern. he agent does A in S spontaneously, having no doubt about what to do, and acts fast and efortlessly. his seems to be a clear case of N-behaviour. She, however, consciously accesses the rule which prescribes the doing of A in S, and observes it intentionally, which are properties of R-behaviour. It is not diicult to imagine more examples of "hybrid" combinations. 20 Given this varied landscape, the sharply diferentiated R-and N-behaviour can be better conceived as paradigms: they show, in the clearest way, the sense in which a normative behaviour and the underlying standard of correctness can be said to be "explicit" or "tacit", and ofer an approximate grid for distinguishing and classifying non-paradigmatic cases in virtue of their reputed similarity with either of the two paradigms.
Let us return to our irst example. Let us suppose that, in some cases, if asked, the agent can immediately make explicit her mental processes: she can consciously access the scheme she has conformed to, she can even express it in an abstract way, reairm her decision to conform and possibly recall the reasons supporting her decision (deeply engaged in a discussion, I stop at a red light; no one is coming; I go a step further, then I stop; although I have paid no attention to my reasoning, I can immediately say that I was inclining to violate the rule, but then I decided to conform). his type of case appear to be very close to paradigmatic R-behaviour. It shares, irst, the same behavioural features of slowness and efort; second, the agent is immediately ready to make explicit the scheme she has conformed to, although, during her acting, she had no conscious access to it. he agent, we could suppose, followed a rule which, albeit not consciously accessed, was just on the "fringe of consciousness": it seems appropriate to talk of "opaque" R-behaviour. (he example is not arbitrary. In fact, Celano seems to admit the possibility of a behaviour being guided by a rule, which is not, however, consciously accessed: a case of "opaque" R-behaviour?). 21 Let us suppose that, in other cases, the agent cannot at all, or cannot easily, make the scheme explicit. Let us imagine, for instance, a swimmer who knew 20 Let us consider the following cases. he agent is guided by a conscious and quite precise mental picture of an action (she has, for instance, a detailed picture of how her ingers should move in a correct front crawl stroke), but she is not able to verbalise it. he agent is guided by a mental picture which functions as an exemplar which a concrete action has to be suiciently similar to in order to be correct, but she is not able to discern which of its features are relevant criteria for "suicient" similarity. In reproducing a melody, the agent is guided by a very precise auditory image of it which she can mentally represent at will, but she does not know any notation system for communicating it in an abstract way. And so on. how to swim a perfect front crawl stroke. Ater a few months long break, she takes up swimming again and tries to repeat the perfect stroke, but fails. She continues trying over and over until she succeeds. During her trying, she had no explicit rule in mind and was guided only by her feelings of appropriateness or wrongness. Ater she succeeds, she is not able at all to describe the perfect stroke in an abstract way, she is only able to perform it again and state with (for a non-expert athlete, astonishing) certainty that it is the perfect stroke. his case is far from paradigmatic R-behaviour. he rule was neither explicit nor on the fringe of consciousness, and it, therefore, seems more appropriate to talk about a norm, a norm still stored in the mind and susceptible to recalling, but provisionally unavailable (i.e., inaccessible even in the "non-intellectual" form). his is a case of "slow & efortful" N-behaviour.
But, let us imagine now a performing artist in search of a new igure. Ater having tried diferent and unsatisfactory ones, she inally inds the "right" solution. During her search, she had no explicit rule in mind and was guided only by her feelings of appropriateness or wrongness. Ater she inds the right solution, she is neither able at all to describe it in an abstract way nor to explain why it is the right one, she is only able to perform it again and repeat that it is the right igure. It seems odd to say that, in so doing, she has followed a norm which set that precise solution as the right one. he solution is genuinely new and is probably not the only one that would have been approved. It seems more appropriate to say that the artist has tried to it the performed igure with a set of indeterminate normative standards, which appear to be very similar to norms, because they are neither formulated nor otherwise consciously accessed, and because they control intuitive judgments of correctness. his is another yet different case of "slow & efortful" N-behaviour. (his example is not arbitrary either. In proposing "acting with style" as an example of N-behaviour, 22 Celano seems to admit implicitly the possibility that N-behaviour might be efortful. Although acting with style does not amount to following a set of explicit rules, it is not always a matter of inding immediately the right solution either: sometimes it requires a series of tries, which are not guided by explicit rules, but by sound intuitions.)
However, other cases are more diicult to relate either to paradigmatic R-behaviour or to paradigmatic N-behaviour: they seem to fall within the domain of indistinction between the two. Let us return to the odd case introduced above. he agent acts fast and efortlessly, but she follows intentionally a consciously accessed rule or at least she can make the rule immediately explicit, expressing it and reairming her decision to conform. he teacher, for instance, orders the student to stand up and she spontaneously conforms. If asked, however, the student immediately explains that she stood up because the teacher Marco Brigaglia www.revus.eu ordered her to stand up and she ought to obey such an order. It seems natural to think that she was following a rule which is either consciously accessed or "just on the fringe of consciousness". Should we interpret the case as "fast & efortless" R-behaviour? At the same time, however, it seems appropriate to say that the student has conformed to a norm (she has the "habit of obeying" teacher's orders). Should we rather say that it is a case of "transparent" N-behaviour?
(3) his way of framing the opposition between R-and N-behaviour, rules and norms -regarding them as paradigms setting a grid for intuitively classifying diferent types of non-paradigmatic cases of normative behaviour in a range of similarity -can appear quite unsatisfactory. A better account should, to some degree, make explicit the criteria of similarity, the core features, if any, of R-and N-behaviour, in virtue of which non-paradigmatic cases should be ascribed to either of the two concepts. Such criteria should be capable of clearly framing at least the most important, if not all, non-paradigmatic cases which, like our last example, seem to fall within the domain of indistinction. Well, I think that such criteria are latent in the paper and can be drawn with little efort.
In describing norms, Celano refers leetingly to the distinction -made famous by D. Kahneman's recent book hinking, Fast and Slow -between two different "systems" in the mind, which operate by producing mental processes with diferent introspective and behavioural features: System 1 produces automatic, quick and efortless mental processes, with "no sense of voluntary control", and System 2 produces slow and efortful mental processes, involving "the subjective experience of agency, choice and concentration". 23 Kahneman's model, which has clearly inluenced Celano's notions, also suggests a particularly appropriate way of improving the opposition between R-and N-behaviour, rules and norms, so as to better frame their interaction and the "hybrid" cases exposed above.
Let us assume that paradigmatic R-and N-behaviours are realised (produced, implemented) by diferent types of physical (neural) structures, regardless of what their diferences may be (diferent types of neural circuits, diferent types of computational patterns, etc.). Let us call them R-structure and N-structure respectively. R-structure is something akin to Kahneman's System 2: it operates slowly and efortfully in producing normative behaviours which are explicit or which are such that they become explicit if they become the focus of conscious attention (they can also develop on a preconscious level, "just on the fringe of consciousness"). N-structure is something akin to Kahneman's System 1: it operates fast and efortlessly in producing tacit normative behaviours, and is, as such, incapable of making these behaviours explicit. hese are essential features of R-and N-structures, the way in which they necessarily function in virtue of their physical constitution. Discussion Let us try to use this sketchy framework for explaining the dynamics of rules and norms that we have encountered above. he functional shit from norm to rule can be explained as the construction, on a previously existing N-structure, of an R-structure of the same content which can inhibit and overrule it. he functional shit from rule to norm can be explained as the construction, on the basis of a previous R-structure, of an N-structure of the same content which can gradually interpose, substitute or even borrow it. he phenomenon of "the deep normative background" can be explained as the physical impossibility of R-structures with certain contents (certain contents -so-called "sub-doxastic representations" -cannot, as such, become explicit). "Opaque" R-behaviour can be explained as an R-structure functioning on a preconscious level ("just on the fringe of consciousness"). he irst case of "slow & efortful" N-behaviour can be explained as a conscious attempt to re-activate a latent N-structure, while the second as a conscious search for a solution, which its satisfactorily with an underlying set of indeterminate N-structures. he last and most problematical example ("fast & efortless" R-behaviour or "transparent" N-behaviour?) can be explained by assuming the coexistence of interconnected N-and R-structures of the same content: the irst produces the behaviour automatically and the second permits the agent to make the behaviour immediately explicit. And so on.
his account of the opposition between R-and N-behaviour allows us to interpret with ease further connotations of rules and norms given by Celano in his paper. Rules, he says, are "intentional" (and "propositional"), but can nevertheless be unconscious (and, I assume, can function unconsciously), while norms are "non-intentional" (and "non-propositional"). 24 Taking the "intentionality" of rules for granted, Celano does not explain how it should be understood. He clearly does not refer to a wide sense of "intentionality", taken as the capacity of the mind-brain to represent the world (in this wide sense, a norm could also be said to be "intentional"). More speciically, "intentionality" is taken plausibly as the capability of the mind-brain to represent the world explicitly. An explicit rule is "intentional" in this sense because it involves an explicit (consciously accessed, mentally formulated, functioning as a reason) mental representation of a state of afairs A in S (the content of the rule). But, Celano admits the possibility of unconscious rules. In which sense can unconscious rules be said to be intentional as well? Because, in virtue of the R-structure which realises them, they can be made explicit: R-structures are capable of producing explicit representations, and unconscious rules are also realised by R-structures. Conversely, a norm can be said to be "non-intentional" because, in virtue of the N-structure which realises it, it cannot be made explicit: N-structures are not capable of producing journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Marco Brigaglia www.revus.eu explicit representations. 25 In the same way, we can also interpret Celano's further statement that a rule is "propositional", while a norm is "non-propositional" if we take "propositionality" as a kind of intentionality: intentional content is "propositional" if it can be expressed in a that-clause. (In § 3.4, I shall return to the notion of "propositionality" in the context of Celano's paper.)
his, I hope, is a faithful reconstruction of the complex framework emerging from Celano's Pre-conventions. In sum, it includes: (1) a list of interrelated properties (explicit, slow & efortful vs. tacit, fast & efortless) setting a general grid for distinguishing, representing and classifying not only "paradigmatic" R-and N-behaviours, but also "hybrid", slightly more diferentiated kinds of normative behaviour; (2) a sketchy outline of rule-following as a dynamic and hierarchically ordered network of automatic N-behaviours, eventually sustaining emergent, more or less ratiocinative episodes of R-behaviour; (3) an explorative hypothesis about the underlying mental architecture, conceived as a dynamic and hierarchically ordered network of N-and R-structures (taken as diferent types of neural structures, regardless of what their diferences may be). Overall, it is a general account of rule-following based on the opposition between rules and norms, Rand N-behaviour. I shall shortly refer to it as the "Rules vs. Norms Framework".
SOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE RULES VS. NORMS FRAMEWORK
In the previous section, I have proposed a systematic reconstruction of the Rules vs. Norms Framework. In this section, I shall further argue that the Framework is the core of Celano's Pre-conventions: it is the keystone of his argument; it is, in its own right, one of the paper's main achievements; it marks a decisive step in Celano's work, pointing at new and promising developments.
Rules and norms in Pre-conventions
First, the Rules vs. Norms Framework plays a crucial role in Celano's argument.
he very notion of a pre-convention and its originality depend on the opposition between rules and norms, R-and N-behaviour. On the one hand, Discussion pre-conventions are actually nothing but a network of N-behaviours shared by (most) members of a group G, the Gs, and characterised by the "dependence condition": "A in S" is (functions as) a norm for (most) Gs, and what causes "A in S" to become a "norm" for a G is the fact that "A in S" is already a norm for (most) Gs. he concept of pre-convention depends, therefore, on the concept of N-behaviour, which is deined by the diferences between it and the more familiar R-behaviour. (Pre-conventions are just a peculiar network of N-behaviours. We can indeed imagine kinds of N-behaviour with diferent origins and structures: for example, "natural" N-behaviours, norms we have an innate inclination to conform to, or "idiosyncratic" N-behaviours, norms acquired through experience, but not generally shared by the groups that we are members of.) On the other hand, the reason for the originality of Celano's pre-conventions is precisely the account he gives of their structure. Celano's pre-conventions and Marmor's "deep conventions" 26 refer basically to the same phenomena. What Celano adds is a diferent way of explaining them. hey cannot be represented, unless metaphorically, as a network of processes, not even unconscious processes, consisting in the application of shared rules or systems of rules (what I have called "R-behaviour"). hey must be represented as a network of processes of a very diferent kind, not ratiocinative but automatic, and nevertheless normative (what I have called "N-behaviour").
But the opposition between R-and N-behaviour is fully intelligible precisely in the light of, and it gains its theoretical strength in virtue of, the entire implicit account it relies upon: the Rules vs. Norms Framework.
Rules and norms beyond Pre-conventions
he importance of the Rules vs. Norms Framework, it seems to me, goes beyond the scope of Pre-conventions. As I hope to have shown, it traces a comprehensive account of rule-following which -although it cannot as yet be considered a complete theory, but rather an outline needing to be improved, deepened, detailed -is, at this stage, coherent, well-structured, intuitively sound. Moreover, its whole design -although arrived at by developing and linking together well-known ideas -seems to me far from trivial.
Let me briely dwell on this last point. In drawing his concepts, Celano follows two main patterns. he starting point is the idea -based on Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following interpreted in terms of Searle's "Background abilities" -that our normative practices cannot be exhaustively represented, unless metaphorically, as the acceptance and observance of systems of rules. A relevant part of our normative practices is controlled by "norms", i.e., schemes which are relevantly diferent from rules because they are tacit (not explicitly represented), but which are also "functionally equivalent" 27 to rules because they operate as standards of correctness. Such schemes, given their very nature, are opaque and remain in the background. At the same time, they make up the ground on which our rules necessarily rest: a tacit yet necessarily presupposed background underlying our explicit normative practices. hen, in order to shed more light on the nature of norms, Celano resorts to the distinction, made famous by D. Kahneman, between slow and fast mental processes: 28 while rules are taken as explicit mental representations underlying slow, ratiocinative, transparent rule-following (what I have called "R-behaviour"), norms are taken as tacit schemes underlying a kind of fast, automatic, blind rule-following (what I have called "N-behaviour"). hus, rules and norms, and with them the tacit background, are openly framed in psychological terms, as diferent mental structures involved in diferent mental processes, deined and distinguished on the basis of both their introspective and behavioural properties. So here it is, in its core, the Rules vs. Norms Framework: a psychological account of rulefollowing focused on the distinction between slow, ratiocinative, transparent R-behaviour and fast, automatic, blind N-behaviour.
he idea that our normative practices rely necessarily on a tacit background appears oten in Celano's previous works. 29 But the psychological account provided by the Rules vs. Norms Framework is a plain novelty, and marks a proper turn in his way of framing problems: psychology has taken centre stage, as far as I know, for the irst time. 30 In spite of the growing fortunes of naturalisation programmes, the use of psychological frameworks in accounting for rules and rule-following dynamics is surely not -at least not yet -mainstream amongst scholars in legal philosophy. But, to my knowledge, some aspects of Celano's Framework -especially its focus on the normativity of fully automatic behaviours and the above outline of the mental processes leading to their execution -are not common even in that part of psychological literature on rule-following which is easily accessible to non-specialists. 31 Discussion In summary, the Rules vs. Norms Framework can be considered, in its own right, a valuable and signiicant achievement of Celano's Pre-conventions, for it provides a sketchy yet coherent, well-structured, plausible and, in some respects, unusual account of rule-following. Being openly framed in psychological terms, it also represents a turn in Celano's work. his turn, I believe, deserves to be deepened by improving the Framework through the adoption of more, and more ine-grained, psychological concepts and models. 32
Further developments
Finally and most importantly, the Rules vs. Norms Framework also traces a very promising path to the further development of some of Celano's old theses and other traditional issues in legal and moral philosophy.
rule-following. We have, on the one hand, "rudimentary" rules and rule-following (or "ruleobserving practices") and, on the other hand, "abstract" rules and rule-following (or "ruleguided behaviours"). Brożek's rudimentary rules and rule-following correspond quite well to Celano's norms and the tacit kind of rule-following I call "norm-conforming behaviour" (more precisely, they correspond to the socially shared norms underlying pre-conventions). Rudimentary rules are "independent of language" and "followed unconsciously", and rudimentary rule-following is "a 'blind' process, almost a reaction", which nevertheless has a normative dimension. Brożek's abstract rules and rule-following correspond to Celano's rules and the explicit kind of rule-following I call (using the same expression Brożek resorts to) "ruleguided behaviour". Abstract rules are "formulated in language" and "followed consciously", and abstract rule-following involves "considering diferent courses of action, weighing rules for and against incompatible ways of conduct and, ultimately, [...] reasoned decisions as to which rule should be followed". On the basis of this account, Brożek provides a reconstruction of the interaction between rudimentary and abstract rules, which is very close to the one emerging from Celano's paper. For example, abstract rules depend on "existing systems of rudimentary rules" much like the way in which Celano's rules rely on a background of norms. With the passing of time, they can turn into rudimentary rules exactly the way in which Celano's rules can turn into norms. Finally, Brożek argues that imitation -taken as the automatic, unreasoned identiication and replication ("embodiment") of patterns of conduct performed by others -is the fundamental mechanism involved in rudimentary rule-following. I am sure that Celano would ind this hypothesis intriguing. 32 For example, it would be interesting to conjugate the notions of R-and N-behaviour with J.
Haidt and F. Bjorklund's "social intuitionism" (Haidt & Bjorklund 2008) . Above all, the possibility of an automatic ex post and "ideological" justiication should be taken into account. he agent acts in a way which she intuitively considers to be correct, having in mind a rule which justiies her action. But, in reality, she does not follow that rule, but a very diferent norm which she is completely unaware of, and which she cannot openly recognise. For instance, Mr Smith reports to the ticket inspector in a bus that a passenger, clearly an immigrant, has not validated his ticket, irmly convinced that he has done the right thing by denouncing a cheater. But, his action and his feeling of appropriateness have not been related, as he believes, to the fact that he has denounced a cheater, but to the fact that he has denounced a cheater who is also an immigrant. In fact, he has never had even the slightest impulse to denounce a cheater unless the cheater looked like an immigrant! Mr Smith has automatically produced an "ideological" justiication for his action, which covers a xenophobic norm deeply encoded in his mind. hese are two of Celano's main theses which could be usefully reframed by taking into account the Rules vs. Norms Framework:
(1) Celano's version of natural law theory, "transcendental" natural law, 33 roughly taken as a set of very undetermined (and conlicting) principles presupposed by our normative practices: the "minimal content" of natural law. he tacit normative background is made of contingent norms, which rest upon, Celano says, "natural" frameworks. Such natural normative frameworks are a plausible interpretation of the principles which deine Celano's "minimal content" of natural law. It would be interesting (a) to improve the Rules vs. Norms Framework by reining and supporting the idea of a natural normative background and by speculating about its possible contents on the basis of the many available theories of moral innatism, 34 and (b) to use this reined Framework to account for the constraints on moral and legal reasoning supposedly exercised by the natural normative background.
(2) Celano's version of particularism. 35 he reasonable (correct) application of a rule, Celano argues, necessarily presupposes a distinction between "normal cases", which the rule applies to, and "exceptional cases", which the rule does not apply to. And this distinction cannot be thought of as deined by other rules: it is a matter of norms. It would be interesting (a) to improve the Rules vs. Norms Framework with a detailed psychological account of how norms and rules interact in defeasible reasoning, and (b) to develop Celano's particularism along the lines of this reined Framework.
Let us also consider some classic topics in legal theory, such as the debate about the concept of law. he network of normative practices of which law consists cannot fully be represented, unless metaphorically, as the acceptance and reasoned construction of systems of explicit rules. here is an underlying level of tacit normative concerns (Schmitt's "konkrete Ordnung"), and a continuous shit of our practices from one level to another, and sometimes a dramatic disconnection between the two (the space between Hart's social rules and social habits is neither empty nor static). he Rules vs. Norms Framework ofers a promising grid for better representing this complex dynamics, and an even more promising one if enriched with more ine-grained psychological concepts and models. 36 Let us take a look at the notion of authority. Authority, taken as legitimate power, is oten deined as the capacity of positing valid rules, existing in virtue of a structure of reasons. Roughly, (a) Y recognises the authority of X if Y believes that the very fact that X prescribes the doing of A in S is, normally, a suicient reason for concluding that, in S, A ought to be done (i.e., for concluding that the rule "A ought to be done in S" is valid); and (b) Y recognises the authority of X on the basis of further reasons (i.e., a "justiication" of X's authority). Such kinds of deinitions "rationalise" authority, reducing its dynamics to a train of explicit processes and completely missing the tacit ones which are part of the ordinary use of the concept (e.g., automatic obedience, automatic signs of submission, automatic acceptance of someone's authority, and so on) and the interaction between the two (e.g., the mutual inluence of the habit of obeying and the explicit belief in a duty to obey; or the role that, in reasoning about the validity of a rule prescribed by an authority, may be played by the unconscious check of the content of the rule on the basis of tacit normative standards). Once again, the Rules vs. Norms Framework provides a promising grid for an account of authority as a normative phenomenon capable of adequately modelling such complex dynamics.
I both predict and wish to see Celano pursue his "psychological turn", developing, following the path traced, more ine-grained psychological models of rule-following based on the distinction between rules and norms, and using the same to shed new light on traditional topics in legal and moral philosophy.
A methodological issue
Important merits of the Rules vs. Norms Framework are its intuitive soundness and its neutrality with regard to their explanation on a neural or computational level. Both merits depend on the speciic way in which the opposition between R-and N-behaviour is framed.
Let me roughly distinguish between three diferent kinds of properties that we can refer to in conceptualising a type of behaviour. he irst ones concern the way in which a particular behaviour is subjectively experienced by the agent. hese I have occasionally called "introspective" properties. he second ones concern a particular behaviour's external signs perceptible by an observer. hese I have called "behavioural" properties. But introspective and behavioural properties are usually thought of as corresponding to (depending on, supervening upon) properties of a very diferent kind: neural or computational features of the physical structures which are supposed to produce the behaviour (e.g., the distribution of the relevant neural networks, activation patterns, digital or analogue information processing, and so on). Let us call them "inner" properties.
he notions of R-and N-behaviour have been deined by referring only to either actual or dispositional introspective (explicit vs. tacit) and behavioural (slow & efortful vs. fast & efortless) properties. And very apparent ones: a conscious experience framed in terms very close to a commonsensical psychol-journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Marco Brigaglia www.revus.eu ogy that everyone is able to use, reducing unusual concepts requiring special philosophical competence to minimum; and external signs easily perceptible by a common observer without the help of special scientiic expertise and technical instruments (such features as blood pressure or pupillary response). Furthermore, no hypothesis has been advanced about the inner properties of the physical structures which produce R-and N-behaviour. his is not to be taken as excluding introspective and behavioural properties, which characterise R-and N-behaviour, corresponding to (depending on, supervening upon) relevantly diferent inner properties. We have indeed assumed that they do ( § 2.3). But, we have carefully avoided committing ourselves to a precise theory about what exactly such inner properties are. hey have been treated as completely opaque and have, as such, not played a part in discriminating cases of R-from cases of N-behaviour: a particular behaviour counts as an instance of R-or N-behaviour depending on its (actual or dispositional) introspective and behavioural properties, which are assumed to supervene upon certain inner properties, regardless of what they may be.
From being thus deined, the notions of R-and N-behaviour, rules and norms, gain a strong intuitive soundness. And this is not a minor virtue for notions which, albeit drawn in psychological terms, are meant to be used not by professional psychologists or neuroscientists, but by legal and moral thinkers. Every attempt at reining them should take this into consideration, balancing between the value of a more precise neuropsychological account and the advantage of easy accessibility. 37 Moreover, the notions of R-and N-behaviour, rules and norms, do not imply any hypothesis about the inner properties of the structures which realise them. hey can, in this sense, be said to remain neutral about the matter. his also seems to me to be a virtue: it is not easy, not to say impossible, for a non-trained student to gain mastery over the enormous and rapidly growing tools and materials of the neuro-and cognitive sciences necessary to support in a serious way hypotheses about the inner properties of a particular behavioural process. It is better to remain modestly silent as much as possible.
In this regard, the only criticism I have to level at Celano regards his jargon in general and his relaxed use of the concept of "propositionality" in particular.
According to Celano, as we have already seen, rules are "propositional", while norms are "non-propositional". A "propositional" rule can, moreover, also be "unconscious" 38 (I assume that the idea of an "unconscious rule" includes the possibility of it producing a behaviour without being consciously accessed). Let us call it the "propositionality thesis" (P-thesis). Celano does not explain how the P-thesis is to be understood, taking it for granted. His only suggestion is that 37 For this methodological argument, see Brigaglia 2015 . 38 Celano 2016 sub-doxastic L-rules; it must be the product of some diferent structure. In this way, the very notions of N-behaviour and norms turn out to be conceptually linked to a very demanding thesis about the inner properties of the physical structures which realise them. Both intuitiveness and neutrality get lost.
he problem is marginal in the paper. Another interpretation of the concept of propositionality is available -one which is fully coherent with the whole framework. It underlies, however, important methodological issues. It is highly desirable that the theory of normativity should embrace more, and more inegrained, psychological concepts and models in order to bridge the gap between old-fashioned metaethics on the one hand, and contemporary moral and social psychology, or even neuro-ethics on the other. But, irst, a tremendous amount of grammatical work is required, a careful reframing of the conceptual vocabulary, while paying careful attention to clearly deining key terms, which, in this paradigm shit, can have relevant yet subtle and unperceived semantic changes. Second, as has above been shown, an efort is required to frame our theses in order to avoid unnecessary implications on levels we are not able to manage.
CONCLUSIONS
In writing Pre-conventions, Celano has tried to show that not all standards of correctness are (function as) explicit rules, and that not all normative behaviours (and especially conventional behaviours) can plausibly be thought of as guided by explicit rules. here are standards of correctness, norms, which exist only in their concrete application, and normative behaviours which are the direct and not relected execution of the correct action. his aim has been, I maintain, fully achieved. But, as I hope to have shown, Celano has arrived at an additional result, which has probably not been intended. He has implicitly set a general account of rule-following based on the distinction between rules and norms. his account, although susceptible to improvement by adopting more ine-grained psychological concepts and models, is on the right track with respect to both its content and its form. I look forward to its future applications.
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